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PERSONA NON GRATA: EXPELLING DIPLOMATS WHO
ABUSE THEIR PRIVILEGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Persona non grata is an efficient and effective means of curbing
the potential abuse of diplomatic immunity. The United States State
Department, in March 1986, used this means to expel twenty-five So-
viet diplomats suspected of espionage.1 Although criticized by the So-
viets and the United Nations, an expulsion of this kind is in accor-
dance with the applicable United Nations treaties and international
law. There are three justifications for this action: one, diplomats can be
expelled if they violate United Nations agreements, namely the Head-
quarters Agreement,2 the United Nations Charter,3 and the General
Convention;4 two, under international law, a receiving state may, for
national security reasons, limit a foreign mission's size;5 and three, a
sovereign state possesses the fundamental right of self-defense which
may be exercised by expelling foreign intelligence agents.
II. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
The roots of diplomatic immunity can be traced back two thou-
sand years to ancient China, India and Egypt." The modern embodi-
ment of the law of diplomatic immunity is the Vienna Convention on
1. Engelberg, Expelled Russians are Termed Spies, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, at
Al, col. 5 [hereinafter Spies]. Valery I. Savchenko, head of the KGB in New York City,
and Vladislav B. Skvortsov, head of the G.R.U., the Soviet military intelligence agency,
were among the twenty-five people expelled. Engelberg, Aid to UN Chief Called Soviet
Spy in Senate Report, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at Al, col. 3 [hereinafter UN Chief].
2. Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America Regard-
ing the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, United States-United Na-
tions, 61 Stat. 3416, T.I.A.S. No. 1676 [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement].
3. U.N. CHARTER.
4. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946,
21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter General Convention].
5. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature Apr. 18,
1961, art. 11, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]; see infra text accompanying note 65.
6. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 504 (D.N.J. 1978); see also Trost v.
Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226, 230 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1945) where Judge Richardson noted
that for centuries representatives engaged in diplomatic functions have been entitled to
safe conduct to and from their countries.
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Diplomatic Relations. 7 The Vienna Convention codifies the customary
law of diplomatic relations, which includes the law of diplomatic im-
munity.8 The United States ultimately ratified the Vienna Convention
and, as codified, it represents the sole United States law on diplomatic
immunity.9
Two privileges delineate diplomatic immunity: the inviolability of
the diplomatic agent, and his immunity from jurisdiction. 10 Inviolabil-
ity is one of the most ancient manifestations of international law, and
it protects the person of the ambassador, his personnel, his dwelling
and his documents."' Immunity from jurisdiction flows from the invio-
lability and gives the ambassador immunity from civil and criminal ju-
risdiction in the state in which he functions.1 2 Together, these two
privileges ensure a diplomat's independence from the receiving state
and permit him to effectively perform his duties.' 3 Such duties include
transacting business between the sending state and the host state,
maintaining relations and providing a vehicle for governments to en-
gage in intercourse.'
Generally, diplomatic immunity is considered absolute and all-en-
compassing. It recognizes, however, certain necessary and logical re-
strictions.'5 One restriction obligates the diplomat to respect the host
state's internal security. Because sovereigns exchange representatives
out of consideration, friendship and regard for one another,' 6 an im-
plied understanding mandates that each state treat foreign diplomats
7. Enger, 472 F. Supp. at 505.
8. Id. "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to
anyone for arrest or detention .... " Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 29. Article
31(1) states: "A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state .... " Id. art. 31(1). The Vienna Convention is codified at 22 U.S.C. §
254b (1982 & Supp. 1987). For an example of another statute providing immunity to
international organizations, see 22 U.S.C. § 288a (1982). For a discussion of various im-
munities defenses, see Note, A Comparison and Analysis of Immunities Defenses
Raised by Soviet Nationals Indicted Under United States Espionage Laws, 2 BROOKLYN
J. INT'L L. 259 (1980).
9. 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
10. See Rose v. The King, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 618, which outlines fundamental principles
of international law.
11. See id. at 641-42.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 642; see also Note, supra note 8, at 272. "Immunity. . . was granted on
the grounds that the diplomatic agent must be able to perform his duties without undue
hinderance [sic], and that extension of such immunity fosters good will among States."
Id.
14. 3 D.L.R. at 641-43.




as it would treat its own. The foreign diplomat, in return, will do noth-
ing to endanger the receiving state's safety. 17 Despite this understand-
ing, a diplomat's breach of his obligation to the host state does not
subject him to that state's judicial power.1 Thus, the second immunity
restriction may be invoked: the receiving state may declare the offend-
ing diplomat persona non grata9 and demand that he be recalled by
the sending state. 0 This Note analyzes the bases for declaring an indi-
17. Id.; see also Note, supra note 8, at 263. The "inviolability of the diplomatic agent
is grounded in three factors: 1. the diplomatic agent is the personal representative of a
sovereign; 2. the importance of the envoy's mission; and 3. the comity of nations." Id. at
263 n.21 (quoting G. SCHWARTZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
558 (6th ed. 1976)). International law, pertaining to diplomatic relations, is based on
comity and political expediency. Id. at 264. Ironically, retribution, the alter ego of com-
ity, has at least on one occasion provided the rationale for protecting purported members
of a state's diplomatic delegation. See Goldberg, Diplomatic Immunity and Terrorism,
1985 NEW ZEALAND L.J. 151, pointing out that the reason the British government allowed
Libyan terrorists to leave the Libyan Embassy in London after shooting a police consta-
ble was that the government was concerned about the safety of the British Mission in
Libya.
18. See Rose v. The King, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 618, 643. Consider, too, the statement of
Montel Ogden that the purpose of diplomatic immunity is to enable one to efficiently
represent the sovereign. "It is not to enable [him] to fulfill tasks outside of diplomatic
activities." Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226, 231 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1945); see also
Note, supra note 8, at 275-80 (discussing functional immunity under the laws of the
United States).
19. Article 9 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 5, sets out the doctrine of persona
non grata. See infra note 59 and accompanying text; see also 44 A.2d at 226; 3 D.L.R. at
618.
20. Declaring an individual persona non grata is an executive function. The Ameri-
can judiciary, however, is loath to allow an individual to escape punishment in espionage
cases. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978), illustrates the American
judiciary's unwillingness to grant immunity in espionage cases. The court rejected the
defendant's immunity claim on three different grounds: First, the defendants did not
have diplomatic status in the eyes of the United States; second, the defendants could not
claim immunity under the International Organization Statute because espionage was not
one of the functions performed in their official capacity; and third, immunity from gen-
eral principles of international law could not be invoked. This third rejection is signifi-
cant in that the court recognized the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as a
codification of the customary law of diplomatic relations. The court held that:
An examination of the pertinent articles of the Vienna
Convention, which I find to be declaratory of the
customary international law, reveals no basis for
cloaking the defendants with the protective blanket
of diplomatic immunity.... [The defendants are not]
by any standard, either codified or customary, within
the class of persons traditionally entitled to the
benefits of immunity from prosecution.
Id. at 506 (footnote omitted). In United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.
1984), the court denied an immunity claim by a Bulgarian employee of the Bulgarian
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vidual persona non grata under codified international law, and focuses
on espionage and the March 1986 expulsion of Soviet nationals.
III. BACKGROUND
Historically, the United States and the Soviet Union have toler-
ated a certain amount of espionage. Ordinarily, each country merely
protests and denies the other's allegations."' Nonetheless, when the
United States discovers a Soviet intelligence officer within its borders,
it customarily declares him persona non grata and demands that he
leave the country.2 There are two reasons for this policy: First, a large
number of Soviet intelligence officers operate in the United States
under diplomatic status which inhibits incarceration;23 and second,
counter-espionage is primarily designed to neutralize foreign espionage
before it can do grave harm.2' The State Department also argues that
expulsion is necessary because the threat of long prison terms in the
United States will not deter Soviet intelligence personnel since they
are not betraying their own country when spying in the United
States. 5 Moreover, it makes little difference whether a Soviet intelli-
gence officer is imprisoned, asked to leave the country, or exchanged;
so long as the spy networks are neutralized and the sources and chan-
Ministry of Foreign Trade after he was indicted on espionage charges. The court held
that the defendant did not have the requisite diplomatic status entitling him to immu-
nity from prosecution. The court went on to say, however, that even if the defendant
were an established mission member, he could still be deprived of immunities under
Articles 9 and 11 of the Vienna Convention. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
Notwithstanding Enger and Kostadinov, diplomatic immunity can be invoked success-
fully. In United States v. Butenko, 384 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967), an American was con-
victed of espionage while his two Soviet co-conspirators were not indicted because of
their diplomatic status. This case demonstrates the appeal of the State Department's use
of persona non grata to prevent espionage before it happens. For another discussion of
Kostadinov and its handling of Articles 9 and 11, see Comment, United States v. Kos-
tadinov, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 267 (1986).
21. Note, Espionage in Transnational Law, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 434, 445 (1972).
The author notes that international law offers little guidance to a state upon its discov-
ery of espionage. Id.; see also Bank, Espionage: The American Judicial Response, An In
Depth Analysis of the Espionage Laws and Related Statutes, 21 Am. U.L. REV. 329, 365
(1972). Both the United States and the Soviet Union have tacitly agreed to occasionally
trade captured agents who do not have diplomatic immunity. Id. For a discussion of the
trade that occurred in Butenko, 384 F.2d at 554, see Bank, supra, at 336.
22. Note, supra note 21, at 445.
23. Bank, supra note 21, at 365; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
24. Bank, supra note 21, at 365.
25. Id. The implication is that spies are heroes in their own country and that Ameri-
can antipathy has no effect.
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nels of information blocked, national security is protected.
2 6
The United States has occasionally expelled individual diplomats
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The State Department, in addition to the espionage charges, as-
serted that the Soviet Mission was too large and thus posed a threat to
American national security. 5 The decision to expel the Soviets was
based largely on a concern that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) could not effectively track so many people. 6 A State Depart-
ment spokesman defending the expulsion stated that limiting the So-
viet United Nations Mission to a reasonable size was consistent with
the Headquarters Agreement and international law.37 The chief Soviet
delegate to the United Nations responded by saying that "[w]e con-
sider the action by the United States Government as absolutely illegal
and running contrary to the agreement between the United Nations
and the United States Government.. .."38
Although the Soviets asserted that the United States had no au-
thority to order such a reduction, they arranged for the twenty-five to
leave the country. The United Nations also questioned the expul-
sion's legality,40 but initiated no formal proceedings to investigate the
matter."' In retaliation, the Soviets reduced the size of the United
States Mission in Moscow by expelling five American diplomats and by
35. Gwertzman, U.S. Expels 25 Soviet Diplomats; Denies Link with Daniloff Affair,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1986, at Al, col. 3; Sciolino, Russians at U.N. to Protest Order,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1986, at A12, col. 3 [hereinafter Protest].
36. Gwertzman, U.S. Is Hopeful Summit Plans Will Go Ahead, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1986, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter Summit]. In the Soviet Union, the Government's Com-
mittee for State Security, the KGB, similarly keeps track of the movements of American
personnel. Id.
37. Id. at All, col. 1.
38. Sciolino, Soviet Not Prepared to Cut Off U.N. Staff, Envoy Says, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13,1986, at A4, col. 2; What the U.N. Rules Say About Expelling Diplomats, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 19, 1986, at A8, col. 1; Spies, supra note 1, at Al, col. 5.
39. UN Chief, supra note 1, at Al, col. 3. The State Department said it had decided
to name the Soviet Mission members to be expelled because Moscow had not cooperated
in reducing the Mission's size voluntarily. Gwertzman, supra note 35, at A12, col. 3.
40. Sciolino, supra note 38, at A4, col. 2; What the U.N. Rules Say About Expelling
Diplomats, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, at A8, col. 1; Spies, supra note 1, at Al, col. 5.
The General Convention states: "The United Nations shall cooperate at all times with
the appropriate authorities of Members to facilitate the proper administration of justice,
secure the observance of police regulations and prevent the occurrence of any abuse in
connection with the privileges, immunities and facilities in this article." General Conven-
tion, supra note 4, art. V, § 21. Despite this obligation, the United Nations questioned
the legality of the expulsion. A United Nations official stated that no country had ever
made a formal complaint about Soviet espionage activity. "Unless people wear a sign
saying 'I am a K.G.B. spy,' how do you want us to know?" the officer asked. UN Chief,
supra note 1, at All, col. 1.
41. The Soviets neither asked the Committee to condemn the order nor asked the
General Secretary to convene a tribunal to resolve the dispute. Protest, supra note 35, at
A12, col. 5; see infra text accompanying note 61.
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ordering fifty more to leave the country.'1 Although much of this spar-
ring is no more than superpower politicking, the question remains
whether the United States may indeed legally expel diplomats under
the United Nations Headquarters Agreement, the United Nations
Charter, and international law.
IV. AGREEMENTS
The United Nations Headquarters Agreement was executed by the
United States and the United Nations in 1947. Its purpose is "to carry
out the resolution adopted by the General Assembly to establish the
seat of the United Nations in New York City and to regulate questions
arising as a result thereof.""" Although the Headquarters Agreement
provides for freedom of transit for United Nations officials, this and
other privileges are qualified throughout the Agreement.4 6 For exam-
ple, even though Section 11 states that "[t]he federal, state or local
authorities of the United States shall not impose any impediments to
transit to or from the headquarters district of (1) representatives of
Members or officials of the United Nations . . .," and Section 13(a)
requires that visas shall be granted without charge and as promptly as
possible, Section 13(b) of the Agreement provides that in cases "of
abuse of such privileges of residence by any such person in activities in
the United States outside his official capacity . . .1 Section 11 shall
not be construed to grant him exemption from the laws and regulations
of the United States regarding the continued residence of aliens .... 47
The United States contends primarily that the expelled Soviet
diplomats engaged in activities outside their official United Nations ca-
42. Schemann, Moscow Expels 5 and Bars U.S. Use of 260 Soviet Aides, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 23, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
43. A White House official said that the decision to expel the twenty-five mission
members, and to do it publicly, was related to a desire to appear tough and to show that
the United States was ready to effectuate retaliatory measures until Mr. Daniloff, an
American journalist accused of spying, was given safe passage home. Gwertzman, supra
note 35, at 1, col. 3; see Schemann, supra note 42, at A12, col. 6.
44. See Headquarters Agreement, supra note 2, preamble. The resolution was
adopted by the General Assembly during the second part of the first session from Oct. 15
to Dec. 15, 1946.
45. Id; see id. § 13(b), 13(b)(1) & 13(b)(3). The Headquarters Agreement requires
that the United States ensure the tranquility of the headquarters district, and implies a
duty to safeguard against disruption by those engaging in espionage. Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 2, art. VI, § 16(a).
46. See United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 502 (D.N.J. 1978), stating that
espionage, the crime with which the defendants are charged, is not one of the functions
performed in the defendants' official capacity. Id. at 502.
47. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 13(b).
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pacity, namely espionage. To use this as justification for expelling the
Soviets, however, the State Department must adhere to proper expul-
sion procedures. Section 13(b)(3) of the Headquarters Agreement
states that persons entitled to privileges and immunities under Section
15, or under the General Convention, shall not be required to leave the
United States other than in accordance with the customary procedure
applicable to diplomatic envoys accredited to the United States.4 8 This
procedural requirement will be more fully discussed below.
Similarly, the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, which supplements the Headquarters Agree-
ment,4 provides that a United Nations member be accorded privileges
and immunities only to safeguard the independent exercise of his func-
tions in connection with the United Nations.20 Article 105(2) of the
United Nations Charter states that representatives of the members
and officials of the United Nations similarly shall enjoy such immuni-
ties as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the organization. 1
The provisions of these documents provide the flexibility neces-
sary to protect the receiving state from the wolf in sheep's clothing.
Privileges like those provided by Sections 11 and 13(c) of the Head-
quarters Agreement do not apply when a United Nations member acts
outside his official capacity. The immunity extended to diplomats to
safeguard their functions in connection with the organization specified
in the General Convention and the United Nations Charter is also con-
sistent with the receiving state's right to expel those who possess diplo-
matic status.02 Therefore, notwithstanding the privileges, immunities
48. Id. § 13(b)(3). Section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement defines resident repre-
sentative and lists four different categories of individuals. For example, Section 15(1)
states "[e]very person designated by a Member as the principal resident representative
to the United Nations of such Member or as a resident representative with the rank of
ambassador or minister plenipotentiary .. " Id. § 15(1).
49. See id. art. I, § 1(c), which makes the General Convention supplemental to the
Headquarters Agreement.
50. General Convention, supra note 4, art. IV, § 14. "Privileges and immunities are
accorded to the representatives of Members not for the personal benefit of the individu-
als themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the United Nations." Id.
51. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 3, § 105(2). Under the United Nations Charter, both
officials of the United Nations and members of representative states shall have the im-
munity necessary for the fulfillment of functions performed within their official capaci-
ties, and shall be accorded functional immunity. See Note, supra note 8, at 280.
52. See Note, supra note 8, at 280-84, for an analysis comparing functional immunity
with absolute immunity; see also cases cited supra note 20, which outline the basis of
functional immunity under United States statutes. Individuals are not given immunity
for acts performed outside their official diplomatic capacity unless they are recognized as
[Vol. 9
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and freedoms granted to foreign diplomats attached to the United Na-
tions, the receiving state may expel diplomats who engage in
espionage. 3
The State Department, by expelling the Soviets, has complied
with the Headquarters Agreement and has observed the customary
procedure applicable to diplomatic envoys accredited to the United
States.8 1 The fundamental process governing the law of diplomatic
privileges and immunities is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations, which sets forth the customary procedure applicable to diplo-
matic envoys accredited to the United States. 55 Article 9 of the Vienna
Convention provides:
1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to
explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head
of the mission ... is persona non grata or that any other
member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any
such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either
recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with
the mission. A person may be declared non grata or not
acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving
State.
2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable pe-
riod to carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this
Article, the receiving State may refuse to recognize the per-
son concerned as a member of the mission.
5 6
diplomats by the State Department under 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1982).
53. The reasoning of United States ex rel. Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425,
437 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), applies here. To allow a member state to the United Nations to
send to the United States members cloaked with immunity "would open the flood gates
for the entry of saboteurs, agents provocateur and others .. " Id. at 437.
54. See Headquarters Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 13(b)(2).
55. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supo. 490, 505 (D.N.J. 1978). The fundamental
governing process regarding the law of diplomatic privileges and immunities is the Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which "is widely acknowledged as the authori-
tative statement of immunity applicable to relations among nations." Id. at 505 n.15.
"Most of the Vienna Convention is binding as customary law even upon nations that
have not ratified it, and many of the treaty articles are declaratory of existing interna-
tional law." Id. at 505. The Vienna Convention was ultimately ratified by the United
States on Dec. 13, 1972 and codified under 22 U.S.C. § 254 to represent the sole United
States law on the subject. Id. at 506. The Headquarters Agreement, supra note 2, art. V,
§ 4, refers to corresponding conditions and obligations the United States accords to dip-
lomatic envoys accredited to it. The General Convention, supra note 4, art. V, § 19,
provides that officials shall be accorded privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic
envoys, in accordance with international law. These provisions therefore provide for the
adherence to and inclusion of the Vienna Convention regarding United Nations officials.
56. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 9.
1988]
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The United States notified the Soviets that members of its Mission
were persona non grata, and therefore adhered to proper expulsion
procedure.
Moreover, the Vienna Convention is a codification of international
relations and is United States federal law. Besides setting forth the
customary procedure, the Convention provides the final legal justifica-
tion for expelling an offending diplomat. Under Article 9, the receiving
state may at any time and without explanation declare any diplomat
persona non grata. This procedure in and of itself constitutes sufficient
legal justification for expulsion, and has been so interpreted by the In-
ternational Court of Justice in the Case Concerning United States Dip-
lomatic and Consular Staff in Iran. 7 In that case, the court rejected
the Iranian assertion that it was justified in holding American Embassy
personnel hostage because the United States had committed criminal
acts in Iran, and the court maintained that even if the alleged criminal
activity of the United States in Iran were established, it was unable to
accept that the activities constituted a justification for Iran's conduct:
This is because diplomatic law itself provides the necessary
means of defence against, and sanction for, illicit activities by
members of diplomatic or consular missions.
The Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 contain express
provisions to meet the case when members of an embassy staff,
under the cover of diplomatic privileges and immunities, en-
gage in such abuses of their functions as espionage or interfer-
ence in the international affairs of the receiving State.5"
The court interpreted the Vienna Convention to mean that the re-
ceiving state may, at any time and without having to explain its deci-
sion, notify the sending state that any particular member of its mission
is persona non grata or unacceptable. 9
V. REDUCTION
The State Department expulsion order was also designed to reduce
the Soviet Mission's size. The State Department argued that the Mis-
sion's size jeopardized national security,6" and asserted that the Soviet
Mission was larger than necessary to perform its diplomatic func-
57. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran Judgment (United
States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 38.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Protest, supra note 35, at A12, col. 3.
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tions " The United Nations legal department, in response, opined that
"any disputes over the size of a mission must be resolved through ne-
gotiations between both sides; if they fail this issue can be brought
before three arbiters." 2 The Americans and the Soviets, however, have
never asked the Secretary General to convene a tribunal to resolve the
dispute." Moreover, it is unlikely that the Americans desired such a
tribunal since the United Nations questioned the expulsion's legality.
Additionally, the State Department was confident that the Soviets
would comply with the expulsion order."4 United Nations lawyers, how-
ever, have also opined that the receiving state may, based on national
security and other considerations, set some size limits on a foreign
mission.65
The Headquarters Agreement, the General Convention, and the
United Nations Charter do not address the size requirement of a
United Nations mission.6 Section 7(b) of the Headquarters Agreement
provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the agreement, or in
the General Convention, the federal, state or local law of the United
States shall apply within the headquarters district. '6 7 Article 11 of the
Vienna Convention, codified as United States law, provides that
[i]n the absence of specific agreement as to the size of the mis-
sion, the receiving State may require that the size of a mission
be kept within limits considered by it to be reasonable and
normal, having regard to the circumstances and conditions in
the receiving State and to the needs of the particular mission."
The principal issue thus is whether the United States' restriction is
"reasonable and normal" in light of the surrounding circumstances.
The United States, in March 1986, reported that 275 officials were
in the three missions comprising the Soviet delegation.6 9 The next larg-
est delegations to the United Nations are the United States Mission,
61. Spies, supra note 1, at A8, col. 3.
62. Protest, supra note 35, at A12, col. 4.
63. Id. at A12, col. 6.
64. Id.
65. Id. It appears that the United Nations lawyers based their opinion on Article 11
of the Vienna Convention, supra note 5. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66. After reviewing the appropriate documents, one will find that the size of a mis-
sion is not addressed. See Protest, supra note 35, at A12, col. 4.
67. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 2, art. III, § 7(b).
68. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
69. There are three missions: the Soviet Mission, and the smaller contingents from
the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics of the Soviet Union. Under the special ar-
rangements dating from the beginnings of the United Nations, the Soviet Union has
been represented by three missions. Gwertzman, supra note 35, at A12, col. 4.
19881
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
with 125 staff members, and the Chinese Mission, with 116.70 The re-
duction order, however, does not affect over 400 Soviet citizens who are
employed by the United Nations as civil servants.7' Thus, the United
Nations contingent of Soviet nationals is approximately five times the
size of the next largest mission. According to American officials, the
approximately 700 Soviets with United Nations related jobs pose a
great risk to national security. 2 The concern that the FBI could not
effectively track such a large number of people weighed heavily in
favor of the reduction order." That concern, however, seemed to focus
on particular individuals suspected of espionage since the State De-
partment originally pressed for the original twenty-five members' ex-
pulsion, and an official stated that if it was found that the total
dropped below 218, more could be added later.74 In light of these cir-
cumstances, the twenty-five person reduction order was not an unrea-
sonable or abnormal request. Furthermore, the order was not arbitrary,
but was aimed at a potentially dangerous group, and although the list
was not made public, the State Department identified specific Soviet
members alleged to be spies.
VI. SELF-DEFENSE
An additional argument that supports the State Department's ac-
tion is grounded in a sovereign state's fundamental right to protect it-
self from intrusions by foreign nationals under the veil of diplomacy.
75
International reality makes it inevitable that foreign nations, friend
and foe, will attempt to probe American industrial technologies and
political intentions s.7  American security authorities estimate that of
the hundreds of Soviet officials stationed in the United States, over
fifty percent engage in collecting intelligence information or recruiting
Americans to collect such information on their behalf.7
The reality of international espionage, however, leads to a conflict
70. Id.
71. Id. at A12, col. 5.
72. Summit, supra note 36, at Al, col. 2.
73. Id.
74. Protest, supra note 35, at A12, col. 6.
75. M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 60
(1961); see also U.N. CHARTER, supra note 3, art. 51, which states "nothing in the Present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed
attack occurs." Although this limits the right of self- defense to a response to an armed
attack, espionage presents the same inherent threat to a state's security and provides an
equal justification. The means of self-defense, however, must be limited to expulsion
pursuant to the Vienna Convention. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
76. Bank, supra note 21, at 329.
77. Id. at 330.
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between two fundamental rights. The diplomat has the right to be free
from local jurisdiction and to conduct the business with which he is
charged 7 s and the state has the right of self-defense. 7 The diplomatic
right, enunciated in the Vienna Convention, is accorded by the receiv-
ing state.80 A state, however, has a right to accord itself a first privi-
lege, that of its own security.8 To decide otherwise would mean that a
right exists superior to the duty a state owes to its own citizens inde-
pendently of its foreign duties: a duty to assure its own security and to
repress crimes against the security of the country.8 2 Plato stated two
thousand years ago that the indispensable precondition of a happy life
is that we commit no sin against ourselves and suffer no wrongs from
others.83 Hobbes professed that the end of a sovereign is the defense of
all his subjects, and the sovereign has the discretion to do what it
thinks necessary to preserve the security of the state by preventing dis-
cord at home and hostility from abroad.84 Contemporary international
theorists also recognize the right of self-defense.8" The exercise of this
fundamental right, however, must be limited in intensity and magni-
tude to what is reasonably necessary.88 Even with this limitation, the
expulsion outlined above passes scrutiny since it was a benign response
to a most malevolent threat.
To illustrate the potential danger, this author points to an event
which occurred in England. Diplomatic privileges and immunities pro-
tected Libyan terrorists who shot a police constable from the windows
of the Libyan Embassy in London. The perpetrators were allowed to
leave the country, and it is believed that the weapon was smuggled out
in a diplomatic bag. 8 This was possible because of their purported dip-
78. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 504 (D.N.J. 1978) (construing W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (1953) and W. HALL, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
223 (8th ed. 1924)).
79. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 75, at 67.
80. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The primary weapon used by the judi-
ciary in denying diplomatic immunity claims is that the individual was not properly rec-
ognized by the United States.
81. Rose v. The King, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 618, 646.
82. Id.
83. PLATO, Laws VIII, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, 1935 (1982). There is grave difficulty
in compassing a power to protect oneself from suffering wrongs. It is only to be fully
achieved by training members of society for warfare. Id.
84. HOBBES, Leviathan, in 23 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 102 (N. Fuller
ed. 1952).
85. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 75, at 217-18.
86. See id. at 220 for a discussion of when self defense is permissible.
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lomatic status. The British have been much criticized for their han-
dling of the situation, and at least one commentator argued that when
diplomats act as terrorists, they are not diplomats at all, and thus can-
not benefit from those immunities to which diplomats are entitled."s
The same argument applies to diplomats engaged in espionage, a crime
for which American legislative and judicial systems have exacted some
of the harshest peacetime penalties."
These crimes are compounded by the circumstances in which they
are perpetrated: under the veil of diplomatic status. Moreover, the dip-
lomat has countervailing duties in response to the privileges accorded
him. The Vienna Convention, Article 41(3), states that "[t]he mission
must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the
mission as laid down in the present Convention or by the other rules of
general international law .... -9' Harboring spies fails to comport with
the mission's function of contributing "to the development of friendly
relations among nations."92
The American response to this threat, expulsion of the Soviets, did
not exceed reasonably necessary measures. The United States perpe-
trated no inclemency and no diplomat was incarcerated. Even though
their diplomatic status was questionable, the alleged spies remained
immune from prosecution. The offending diplomats were merely sent
home.
Even assuming that the twenty-five expelled Soviets were genuine
diplomats, contrary to the argument made against the Libyans, the
contention that a diplomatic envoy may do whatever he chooses is un-
supported in the law. A precondition to the privileges he enjoys is that
he act and behave in a manner that harmonizes with the receiving
state's internal order.9 3 "A diplomatic envoy cannot make it a point of
complaint if injured in consequence of his own unjustifiable behavior,
as for instance in attacking an individual who in self-defense retali-
89. Higgings, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United
Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 649 (1985).
90. Werner, American Gets Life for Giving Secrets to Israel, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5,
1987, at Al, col. 2. Jonathon Jay Pollard, who pleaded guilty to spying for Israel, was
given a life sentence even though the Justice department did not ask for one. John A.
Walker, Jr. was sentenced to life in prison with a recommendation from the judge for no
parole. Walker also pleaded guilty; he provided classified Navy documents to the Soviet
Union. Id.; see also Bank, supra note 21, at 331.
91. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 41(3).
92. Goldberg, The Shoot-out at the Libyan Self Styled People's Bureau: A Case of
State Supported Terrorism, 30 S.D.L. REV. 1 (1984).




ates."" If an ambassador attacks a man, the man may lawfully defend
himself." Similarly, the receiving state has the fundamental right to
protect itself, and expelling spies is a reasonable means of achieving
that end.
VII. CONCLUSION
Diplomatic immunity can and has been successfully pleaded to
charges of espionage. 6 Diplomatic immunity from prosecution, how-
ever, does not extend to immunity from expulsion. Expulsion is per-
mitted under international law, and under the laws of the United
States. To a great extent, expulsion eliminates the need to agonize over
the potential abuse of diplomatic status because expulsion is used as a
preventive. There is no need to anticipate the immunity defense as
there is in a prosecution. Persona non grata is therefore superior to
prosecution as a means of discouraging espionage since it allows the
receiving state to prevent serious damage to its national security,
rather than relying on retribution as its sole remedy.
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